

Staying active and focused? The effect of parliamentary performance on candidate renomination and promotion

Party Politics

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Abstract

A large body of literature has focused on potential causes and consequences of candidate nomination procedures. One of the received wisdoms in this literature is that loyalty to the party leadership in centralized systems and personal vote-earning attributes in decentralized systems rank in priority for representatives' career prospects. However, the determinants of candidate nomination in countries with centralized nomination procedures have been significantly undertheorized, due in part to the implicit assumption that party loyalty outweighs any other factor in determining career decisions. We close this gap by analyzing nomination and promotion decisions in Turkey, a closed-list PR system with highly centralized nomination procedures. We argue that representatives' parliamentary performance such as parliamentary activeness and issue concentration influence parties' nomination and promotion decisions. Utilizing original data sets of biographies of 1100 MPs who served in parliament between 2002 and 2011, and over 18,000 parliamentary speeches and 1040 bill cosponsorships, we estimate empirical models that are explicitly derived from the underlying theoretical model and find evidence that party leaderships favor incumbents who make more speeches and who display higher issue concentration, while penalizing electorally safe incumbents who seek legislative influence through private members' bills (PMBs). Results offer important implications for the study of intraparty politics and parliamentary behavior in general, and candidate nomination in particular.

Keywords

candidate renomination, intraparty politics, parliamentary careers, party leadership, parliamentary performance

Introduction

Nomination of candidates is regarded as the primary function and the distinctive feature of political parties in modern democracies (Sartori 1976; Schattschneider 1942). The study of democratic processes remains incomplete without fully understanding the process of choosing candidates; devising the menu of candidates itself, using Rahat's analogy, constitutes the primary step of the electoral process as "it all happens before even a single vote is cast in a general election" (Rahat 2007: 157). Quite unsurprisingly, this important process has a wide range of consequences for legislative

behavior, the composition of legislatures, representation, and accountability (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Matland and Studlar, 2004; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Norris, 1997; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Rahat, 2007; Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008).

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Despite its political and theoretical implications, particular aspects of candidate nomination procedures have been undertheorized. Existing scholarship focuses extensively on the concept of loyalty when investigating the consequences of nomination procedures. Siavelis and Morgenstern's (2008: 20) typology of candidate types, for instance, explicitly assumes that MPs in closed-list PR systems are typically "party loyalists" who have no incentive to engage in individualized parliamentary behavior and rely heavily on "extolling party platform" for renomination. In Jones' (2008: 75) words, "the principal role of [party loyalists] is to provide the votes on the floor (and in committee)." Although it is implicitly assumed that legislators have one important duty (i.e. being a party loyalist) to keep their seats in closed systems (Golden and Picci, 2015), empirical research shows that MPs in list-PR systems "face at least as great, and possibly greater, threats from . . . the party gatekeepers in PR-party list systems than they do from a more open system" (Matland and Studlar, 2004: 105; see also Manow, 2007). Accordingly, centralized political systems not only have much stronger party unity (Depauw and Martin, 2009), but also face higher turnover rates than other systems (Manow, 2007; Matland and Studlar, 2004). Following this empirical fact, the major puzzle that remains to be addressed is as follows: what does explain the reselection and promotion of incumbent MPs in a political context where there is little variation in loyalty to the party and where legislative turnover is relatively high? In other words, what other factors does the party leadership take into account while renominating and promoting incumbent MPs? In an attempt to fill this theoretical gap, we argue that various aspects of parliamentary behavior can serve as a proxy to simplify the candidate evaluations by the party leadership. For one thing, "parliamentary activity might be a way to demonstrate potential and ability for leadership positions" (Louwerse and Otjes, 2016: 781).

In the remainder of the present study, we first provide a brief overview of the study of nomination procedures in comparative perspective and then develop a number of testable hypotheses that predict variation in renomination and promotion decisions. The subsequent sections introduce our original data; report our results based on a series of logistic, ordered logistic, and OLS regressions; and conclude with potential implications of our findings.

Theorizing the determinants of candidate renomination and promotion

A large body of research has dealt with the determinants and consequences of candidate selection in democratic polities (Akirav, 2010; Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Hazan, 2002; Hazan and Rahat, 2000; Lundell, 2004; Norris, 1996; Pennings and Hazan, 2001; Shomer, 2014). Although the determinants of candidate selection remain relatively unknown (see Lundell, 2004; Shomer, 2014), an important

consensus regarding the consequences of candidate selection procedures has emerged: legislative behavior is highly responsive to institutional incentives (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Crisp et al., 2004; Faas, 2003; Hix, 2004; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). As Koop and Bittner (2011) emphasize, "candidates tend to focus on representing those who they feel have a role to play in deciding their political futures" (p. 433). However, surprisingly little is known about the nature of the interaction between institutional incentives, parliamentary behavior, and MPs' career prospects in party-centered systems. More specifically, the potential influence of parliamentary activities on career prospects in systems with centralized selection and election procedures has escaped careful scrutiny due to the implicit assumption that parliamentary activities in such systems are of little use for MPs' career prospects.

One major assumption is that loyalty to the party leadership is the single most important factor that helps MPs get renominated or promoted (Depauw and Martin, 2009; Frech, 2016). Then, what does explain high turnover rates in centralized systems where deviation from the party line among MPs is uncommon? We argue that MPs' engagement in parliamentary activities can help us better understand the nomination and promotion decisions made behind closed doors. Engagement in parliamentary activities can signal interest and expertise in issues that matter most to the public, media, and party leadership.

Parliamentary activities and MPs' career prospects

MPs can engage in what Louwerse and Otjes (2016) call personalized parliamentary activities for a variety of reasons (Fernandes et al., 2017; Proksch and Slapin, 2012; Shomer, 2009). First, these activities provide legislators with an opportunity to build a public image based on their role orientations (e.g. "constituency servant"), policy priorities (e.g. policy advocate), or partisanship (e.g. party loyal). After all, party selectorates seek to recruit candidates who have gained public prominence in politics (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Norris, 1997). Analyzing three countries with flexible-list systems in Europe, André et al. (2015) show that party selectorates reward candidates who obtain higher number of preference votes with a better rank in party list. One implication of this is that although party selectorates are the sole authority in determining party lists, representatives' effort to gain public prominence can help them get reselected by the party leadership.

We now know that MPs find strategic value in engagement in non-legislative activities such as parliamentary speeches and questions so as to influence the political agenda of government (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010; Green-Pedersen, 2010). MPs also engage in personalized activities to signal interest in issues their parties care about and the media pay particular attention to

(Vliegthart and Walgrave, 2011). While non-legislative activities performed by MPs often generate media attention and public interest (Martin, 2011), it is also true that MPs from both opposition and government parties take their cues from the media (Vliegthart et al., 2016). This two-way relationship between parliamentary activities and media coverage implies that there are good reasons for MPs to engage in personalized initiatives to signal interest in issues that matter most to their parties and the public (see also Herbst, 1998; Vliegthart et al., 2013).

Maltzman and Sigelman (1996: 821) contend that “floor speeches provide an opportunity for ‘position-taking’, ‘advertising’ and ‘credit-claiming’, key strategies for enhancing one’s chances of being reelected.” Similarly, Searing (1994) attaches particular importance to floor time and views it as an arena where legislators compete to influence the political process. In fact, one of the interviewees in Searing’s study stated that “I hope that one can just make sufficient impact with making speeches in the House. I think one has to do that. I now sort of intend to try and make some more, to do a little bit more to improve my striking rate” (p. 101). On the other hand, Searing argues maximizing one’s career prospects by speaking regularly in the house should be enhanced by “avoiding the label ‘maverick’” (p. 106).

A growing body of research indicates that representatives make strategic use of parliamentary activities to further their careers in various contexts. Fernandes et al. (2017), for instance, show that representatives in party-centered systems utilize parliamentary activities to maximize their reselection and reelection prospects. Ciftci and Yildirim (2017) find empirical evidence that MPs who perceived the party leadership to be the sole authority in candidate selection and promotion decisions spent more time on constituency-oriented activities that are visible to the party leadership (e.g. asking constituency-oriented parliamentary questions) than activities that are invisible to the party (e.g. helping constituency with problems in the province). Slapin and Proksch (2010) stated that speeches in the European Parliament “provide members with an opportunity to create a record of positive activity for their national party to further their chances for reelection,” and this is particularly true “when national parties have more control over candidate selection at election time” (Slapin and Proksch, 2010: 334; see also Van Vonno and Louwse, 2012). This is for a good reason: Bochel and Denver’s (1983) study of candidate selection in the Labor Party points out that local selectors prioritize articulateness over other candidate characteristics. Authors find that good speakers are more desirable than hardworking, attractive, educated and intelligent, local, and experienced candidates.

In a recent piece, Louwse and Otjes (2016) find that MPs who were elected with preference votes and those who did not have an individual mandate were equally likely to

engage in personalized parliamentary activities, reaching the conclusion that “instead of list position determining activity, activity may determine list position” (p. 794, see also Van Vonno and Louwse, 2012). More importantly, they find ample evidence that MPs adjust their level of engagement in parliamentary activities based on the activity of party colleagues and committee peers. Indeed, floor speeches are organized in a zero-sum fashion; floor time is a scarce resource that MPs can utilize to reach various goals (Cox 2006: 142).

Simply toeing the party line in legislative voting does not guarantee renomination and promotion, nor does it help incumbents achieve name recognition in party-centered systems. Incumbent legislators elected in these systems are expected to actively campaign for national party goals without neglecting the localized goals, such as campaigning on issues of importance to the constituency (Karlsen and Skogerbø, 2015). Based on their visibility to the party leadership and the constituents, parliamentary activities provide MPs with a variety of options to choose from to signal interest in party, policy, or constituency matters (Ciftci and Yildirim, 2017; Louwse and Otjes, 2016). Miquel and Snyder (2006) show that being active in legislatures, having general knowledge and expertise in special fields, and having aptitude for the overall legislative process increase incumbents’ electoral and promotion prospects. Although not conclusive, empirical evidence obtained from preliminary analyses based on various electoral contexts implies that party leaderships reward active MPs in parliament (Marangoni and Russo, 2016). Additionally, we know that incumbents with high level of personal reputation are attractive to political parties (Moral et al., 2015), where parliamentary activities may be regarded as a means to enhance name recognition and personal reputation (Rahat and Sheaffer, 2007; Searing, 1994).

Two important features qualify parliamentary speeches as a means through which to attract attention and signal interest and expertise in the Turkish context. First, parliamentary speeches are relatively cost-free compared to other parliamentary activities. Unlike parliamentary questions, speeches do not need to conform to a set of rules (e.g. content, word limit) and do not require any action by fellow parliamentarians. Second, parliamentary speeches are free from party discipline and not subject to the approval of the gatekeepers within the party. To this end, the ability to take the floor without specifying the content or target of their speeches and without the permission of the party leadership provide MPs with an important opportunity to carry out various tasks that help them gain prominence in the eyes of the public and the party leadership. They are increasingly used to examine various research questions about legislators’ policy positions, role orientations, and party loyalty in political science research (Baumann et al., 2017; Laver et al., 2003; Proksch and Slapin 2010; Slapin

and Proksch 2010). Bäck and Debus (2016: 16) summarize some of the advantages of analyzing speeches as follows:

First, for many parliaments it is simply the fact that more cases are available, because recorded votes are rare in many legislatures while speeches are not. Second, as regards the issues covered, we reduce selection bias . . . Although controversial issues may give rise to more speeches, even the most uncontroversial ones will attract some attention from MPs. Third, . . . [s]peeches allow for much more fine-grained evaluations of the issue at stake.

H1a: MPs who make more speeches in the parliament are more likely to be renominated and/or promoted in party list in the following election.

The link between one's engagement in parliamentary speeches and renomination or promotion prospects should be conditional on candidate's preexisting electoral prospects (see Bowler, 2010). This is because already prominent MPs may benefit little from making parliamentary speeches.

H1b: Electorally unsafe MPs should benefit more from making parliamentary speeches than their electorally safe counterparts in the following election.

However, not all parliamentary speeches are equal; one should distinguish between speeches that MPs get to make on a daily basis and the speeches that follow a systematic pattern as a function of MPs' own policy agenda and issue expertise. Put differently, the effect of absolute number of parliamentary speeches on MP's career prospects should depend on the qualitative characteristics of these speeches. Of those who make a similar number of speeches in a given year, MPs who concentrate more on particular policy issues should not only be more likely to attract public attention but should also be able to advertise themselves as policy advocates.

As Jones (2001) argues in his seminal work, attention is scarce and decision-making authorities "must prioritize the issues that are most urgent and important to them" (Jennings et al., 2011). Although parties generally choose to draw attention only to particular political issues for electoral reasons (Budge and Farlie, 1983), they also need MPs who can engage in parliamentary debates on various policy issues. As Schattschneider (1960) argues in his seminal work, a more diverse agenda increases political competition and provides the opposition with more opportunities to pressure the government (Jennings et al., 2011). To this end, opposition parties generally seek to bring a more diverse set of issues to the parliament and force the government to broaden the range of issues that require parliamentary attention. Since non-legislative activities are increasingly used by parties in issue competition (Green-Pedersen, 2010), both opposition and government parties should prioritize speakers who signal interest, competence,

and expertise in a narrower range of issues over those who speak about a very broad range of topics.

H2: MPs with higher issue concentration in parliamentary speeches are more likely to be renominated and promoted in party list in the following election.

There is substantial evidence that legislative activities such as private members' bills (PMBs), parliamentary speeches and questions play a role in individual politicians' electoral opportunities, both in renomination (Put and Maddens, 2013) and reelection ends (Bowler, 2010; Bräuninger et al., 2012; Mayhew, 1974; Shomer, 2009). However, one may argue that PMBs have far more important consequences in regard to party discipline and agenda setting, as PMBs, unlike parliamentary speeches, usually require further action. Nevertheless, relatively little is known about the motives behind and consequences of introducing PMBs. In fact, as Bräuninger et al. (2012) highlight, many studies regarding the function of parliamentary bills are descriptive. Usually, MPs can either introduce a PMB or cosponsor one. In various cases such as Turkey, Israel prior to 1992, and the United Kingdom, only a little number of private members' bill (PMB) pass into law (Bowler, 2010; Hazama et al., 2007; Rahat and Hazan, 2001). Then, what can be the reasons for the MPs to initiate or cosponsor private members' bills? It is highlighted that MPs make strategic use of PMBs for a variety of reasons. Introducing bills may enhance MPs' name recognition (Rahat and Sheaffer, 2007), the bills can be used for position taking (Bräuninger and Debus, 2009), especially new MPs introduce more bills to increase their reputation (Shomer, 2009), and MPs can seek to appeal to the regional constituency (Bowler, 2010; Bräuninger et al., 2012; Crisp et al., 2004). In addition to these potential uses of PMBs, the primary motivation to introduce or cosponsor PMBs may be to influence the policymaking process and government agenda, as personalized parliamentary activities have limited electoral payoffs in closed-list PR systems (Carey and Shugart, 1995).

Although the likelihood of a PMB becoming a law is extremely low (Hazama et al., 2007), MPs can still make strategic use of these activities to increase their name recognition (Bowler, 2010; Shomer, 2009). However, unlike parliamentary speeches, PMBs are not cost-free initiatives. We argue that the way party leadership approaches to PMBs in regard to MPs' parliamentary performance is fairly divergent from other parliamentary activities for two reasons. On the one hand, MPs may contribute to the advancement of their party agenda by introducing or cosponsoring PMBs. On the other hand, already prominent MPs who enjoy having safe ranks in party list may be perceived as a potential challenger to the party leadership when developing an active and independent agenda to influence policymaking and attract public attention via

PMBs. Indeed, Sheaffer and Tzionit (2006) found that MPs' lawmaking initiatives in Israel did not bring them the benefit they hoped for in the following election. In a similar vein, Golden and Picci's (2015) study shows that party leaderships in Italy penalize incumbents who served several terms. In short, although parties may look favorably to an average MP who actively proposes legislation and promotes the party agenda, the party leadership may remain skeptical about prominent MPs who can potentially attract too much attention by influencing the legislative process via PMBs. Party leadership can thus seek to limit the progressive ambition of their co-partisans (Strøm and Müller, 2009).

H3a: MPs who introduce and cosponsor more PMBs in the parliament are more likely to be renominated and promoted in party list in the following election.

H3b: Electorally safe MPs are more likely to be penalized for introducing and cosponsoring PMBs than their electorally unsafe counterparts in the following election.

Renomination procedures and parliamentary behavior in Turkey

During the period we covered in this study, Turkey was a unitary state with a parliamentary system. The legislators were elected from 85 different constituencies in different sizes, with the district magnitudes ranging between 2 and 31.¹ Turkey uses a closed party–list proportional representation system using D'Hondt formula to allocate seats and engaged with a national electoral threshold of 10%, a system where individual representatives are usually assumed to have little incentive to engage in personalized parliamentary activities (Carey and Shugart 1995). Using Hazan and Rahat (2001)'s terminology, Turkish political parties employ an exclusive candidate selection method, where the party leadership is the only authority that determines the party list. Concentration of power at the central level (Ayan, 2010: 197) and strong party discipline in parliament are important characteristics of Turkish politics (Özbudun, 2000); consequently, party loyalty and party control are significant factors in candidate selection process. Except the pro-Kurdish party, the major three parties in the parliament rely heavily upon the party leadership for nomination and promotion decisions (Çiftçi, 2016). Taken together, one would expect MPs to be primarily concerned with signaling loyalty to the party leadership and less concerned with engagement in developing personal vote-earning attributes. In other words, Turkey constitutes a least-likely case to test the effect of parliamentary performance on MPs' career prospects for several reasons.

The present study focuses on the link between parliamentary behavior and MPs' career prospects between 2002 and 2011. The period starting with the November 2002

general election has led to significant changes in the Turkish party system, replacing a political environment best known with early elections, short-lived governments, and political and economic instability (Sayar, 2007). Consequently, 2002 and onward constitute a political environment more suitable to observe the effect of parliamentary performance, one in which the party system is more stable and the life span of governments are significantly longer compared to the period ended with the 2002 elections. Since parliamentary activities from the 24th legislative term (2011–2015) were not made available from the archives, our analysis covers two legislative terms between 2002 and 2011.

Data and methods

We utilize two original data sets to explore the effect of parliamentary performance on MPs' renomination and promotion prospects. Using the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the Supreme Board of Elections (YSK), and the Official Gazette of Turkey archives, we collected biographical information of all the incumbent MPs who served in parliament between 2002 and 2011 ($N = 1040$) and who made at least one speech in parliament, along with their political characteristics such as party affiliations and electoral districts MPs represent. More specifically, the lists of legislative candidates in each national election including their names, educational and occupational backgrounds, and positions in party list were compiled from the YSK, while official results of these elections showing the winning candidates' names and their districts were collected from the Official Gazette published between 2002 and 2011. To measure MPs' parliamentary activity, we collected over 18,000 speeches and 1040 bill sponsorships by these MPs between 2002 and 2011 (the 22nd and 23rd parliamentary terms), where we collapsed these data by MPs to match with MPs' biographical information.

As described below in more detail, we make use of three dependent variables that measure MP's career outcome at $t+1$. Our first dependent variable measures whether an MP was renominated in the following election, while our second dependent variable is an ordinal variable that ranks MPs' overall career outcomes: not renominated, renominated with declining party list, renominated with same party list, renominated with improved party list. Finally, excluding those who were not renominated from our data set, we estimate OLS regressions to predict the decimal logarithm of the candidate's list position at election $t+1$. More than 44% of all MPs included in our data set were renominated by their parties in the 2007 and 2011 general elections. Among 1009 MPs who served between 2002 and 2011, 134 MPs improved their party rank, 184 remained in the same rank, 121 MPs were placed at a lower rank, and 570 MPs were not renominated.²

We measure parliamentary performance with two types of parliamentary activities, the number of speeches and bill

sponsorships performed by individual MPs within a legislative term. Since the speech and bill sponsorship data are skewed, we log transformed these variables. We interact our performance variables with MP's electoral safety because we assume that MPs differ in renomination prospects conditional on their previously established positions in the party list. We developed a measure of electoral safety that is calculated by subtracting an MP's position in party list from the number of seats won by the MP's party in that electoral province, where the bigger numbers indicate higher electoral safety. If the MP was ranked fifth in an electoral province where her party won six seats in the last election, for example, the MP's distance to the last "safe seat" (i.e. electoral safety) is 1.

In addition to these two measures, we further explore MPs' parliamentary speeches to provide a more nuanced account of the link between parliamentary behavior and career prospects. We use Shannon's H (1948) to measure the issue concentration in parliamentary speeches, which is the sum of probabilities of the different possible issue categories for each MP.³ Since higher values of entropy normally indicate higher issue diversity, we reversed the entropy scale to make it easier to interpret the issue concentration. We also control for the frequency with which MPs make speeches about "hard" issues that may arguably attract more attention from the public and media. The variable "hard issues" is a ratio calculated as the sum of speeches about macroeconomy, finance, energy, defense, and government operations divided by the total number of speeches made by each MP.⁴ In addition, MPs may get rewarded for speaking about the issues that are most important to their parties.⁵ To account for this, we develop a measure of "core issues" utilizing data on the most salient issues in parties' legislative agenda (Bulut, 2015). Finally, we control for the impact of other variables including district magnitude, MP's gender, age (and age-squared), party status (opposition and government), and the 22nd legislative term. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics.⁶

Results

We begin our analysis by exploring the determinants of renomination in the following election. Broadly speaking, we hypothesized that MPs who make strategic use of parliamentary activities should be more likely to be renominated by the party leadership. Results from the logistic regression models testing our hypotheses that are derived from this reasoning are reported in Table 2. As shown in the table, speechmaking during legislative proceedings in the legislature is positively associated with renomination prospects, where the coefficients achieve high statistical significance in all four models ($p < 0.001$). On the other hand, PMBs variable carries inconsistent signs and it does not achieve statistical significance in any model. The entropy variable indicates that MPs with higher issue concentration

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

Variables	N	Mean	Std.		
			Dev.	Min.	Max.
District magnitude	1040	10.74	8.474	2	31
Renominated	1031	0.433	0.496	0	1
AKP	1040	0.637	0.481	0	1
CHP	1040	0.265	0.442	0	1
MHP	1040	0.0673	0.251	0	1
Opposition	1040	0.362	0.48	0	1
Female	1040	0.0692	0.254	0	1
22nd Term	1040	0.502	0.500	0	1
Age	1040	49.58	8.609	30	85
Age ²	1040	2532	875.4	900	7225
Speech (log)	1036	2.346	1.185	0	5.883
Career improvement	1040	0.857	1.118	0	3
Electoral safety	1003	2.209	2.632	0	15
Electoral Safety \times Speech	999	4.998	7.396	0	58.38
Hard issues	1036	0.617	0.236	0	1
Core issues	1005	0.637	0.232	0	1
Localness	1040	0.646	0.478	0	1
Entropy	1040	1.705	0.612	0.47	3
Private members' bills (log)	1036	2.525	0.964	0	4.883
Electoral Safety \times PMBs	1000	5.055	6.391	0	39.99
List position at election _{t+1} (log)	446	0.811	0.756	0	2.708
List position at election _t (log)	1003	0.901	0.741	0	2.773
Education	1040	2.908	0.322	1	3

Note: Acronyms for Turkish political parties listed in the table are as follows: AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party), CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party), MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party).

in parliamentary speeches are significantly more likely to be renominated, a finding that is robust to different model specifications. Electorally safe and more educated MPs are more likely to be renominated by the party leadership, while gender, age, district magnitude, and term have no statistical association with MPs' renomination prospects. The interactions between performance variables and MP's electoral safety reveal that the effect of parliamentary speeches on renomination prospects does not significantly vary with electoral safety. However, it is important to note that the interaction between electoral safety and PMBs carries a negative sign and achieves statistical significance at various levels, which implies that efforts to influence policymaking process via PMBs harm the renomination prospects of electorally safe MPs. We will further scrutinize this finding in the following sections.

We further explore the effect of parliamentary activities on MPs' career prospects by unpacking the determinants of MPs' improvement in party list. We previously argued that parliamentary activities not only increase MPs' renomination prospects, but also help them get a higher rank in party list. Models 5 through 8 use a four-scale dependent variable that ranks career outcomes as

Table 2. Logistic regression on the effect of parliamentary performance on candidate renomination.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Speech (log)	0.452*** (0.135)	0.527*** (0.112)	0.455*** (0.134)	0.206** (0.0914)
Private members' bills (log)	0.0398 (0.138)	-0.146 (0.105)	0.0327 (0.108)	0.0291 (0.124)
Electoral Safety × Speech	0.0168 (0.0257)		0.0160 (0.0256)	0.0244 (0.0259)
Electoral Safety × PMBs	-0.0590** (0.0300)		-0.0589** (0.0296)	-0.0568* (0.0305)
Electoral safety	0.210** (0.0824)	0.112*** (0.0343)	0.209** (0.0819)	0.192** (0.0795)
Hard issues	-0.0600 (0.326)	-0.115 (0.320)	-0.0490 (0.321)	
Core issues	-0.0270 (0.336)	-0.0332 (0.335)	-0.0324 (0.335)	
Entropy	0.585*** (0.226)	0.605*** (0.223)	0.575*** (0.221)	
Localness	-0.266 (0.163)	-0.260 (0.162)	-0.265 (0.163)	-0.289* (0.149)
Education	0.488** (0.239)		0.487** (0.238)	0.521** (0.240)
Female	0.0861 (0.288)	0.102 (0.286)	0.0930 (0.286)	0.0141 (0.279)
Age	0.0268 (0.0709)	0.0274 (0.0713)	0.0281 (0.0707)	0.0171 (0.0693)
Age ²	-0.000775 (0.000709)	-0.000773 (0.000712)	-0.000783 (0.000705)	-0.000672 (0.000689)
District magnitude	-0.00247 (0.0111)	-0.00206 (0.0111)	-0.00210 (0.0108)	
Opposition	0.0210 (0.207)	0.0393 (0.202)		
22nd term	-0.0334 (0.179)	-0.00818 (0.177)		0.0678 (0.171)
Constant	-3.169 (1.961)	-1.514 (1.877)	-3.197 (1.961)	-1.567 (1.838)
Observations	987	987	987	987
Log pseudolikelihood	-632.54	-636.75	-632.57	-636.92
Pseudo-R ²	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Table 3. Ordered logistic regressions on the effect of parliamentary activities on MPs' overall career prospects.

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Speech (log)	0.515*** (0.123)	0.519*** (0.0997)	0.504*** (0.123)	0.262*** (0.0878)
Private members' bills (log)	0.0153 (0.128)	-0.209** (0.0932)	-0.0393 (0.103)	-0.0460 (0.116)
Electoral Safety × Speech	-0.0115 (0.0204)		-0.0108 (0.0202)	-0.00465 (0.0208)
Electoral safety × PMBs	-0.0658*** (0.0232)		-0.0625*** (0.0228)	-0.0584** (0.0233)
Electoral Safety	0.224*** (0.0748)	0.0509 (0.0310)	0.222*** (0.0746)	0.220*** (0.0733)
Hard issues	0.0653 (0.298)	0.00455 (0.293)	0.0492 (0.293)	
Core issues	0.160 (0.309)	0.152 (0.309)	0.145 (0.307)	
Entropy	0.554*** (0.204)	0.536*** (0.203)	0.567*** (0.198)	
Localness	-0.226 (0.151)	-0.219 (0.149)	-0.223 (0.150)	-0.294** (0.139)
Education	0.489** (0.225)		0.500** (0.226)	0.514** (0.224)
Female	0.464 (0.302)	0.446 (0.301)	0.465 (0.303)	0.439 (0.295)
Age	-0.00115 (0.0669)	0.00524 (0.0672)	0.000876 (0.0671)	-0.0127 (0.0661)
Age ²	-0.000479 (0.000665)	-0.000542 (0.000667)	-0.000519 (0.000666)	-0.000364 (0.000654)
District magnitude	0.00985 (0.0104)	0.0106 (0.0104)	0.00772 (0.00999)	
Opposition	-0.176 (0.200)	-0.113 (0.194)		
22nd Term	-0.0509 (0.168)	-0.0278 (0.167)		0.0944 (0.157)
Constant cut1	2.742 (1.865)	0.900 (1.773)	2.693 (1.872)	0.750 (1.754)
Constant cut2	3.307* (1.867)	1.457 (1.774)	3.258* (1.874)	1.310 (1.756)
Constant cut3	4.502** (1.865)	2.634 (1.772)	4.451** (1.872)	2.490 (1.754)
Observations	996	996	996	996
Log pseudolikelihood	-1103.8	-1110.4	-1104.2	-1110.9
Pseudo-R ²	0.045	0.039	0.044	0.038

Note: Dependent variable is an ordinal variable, where 3 = "improved party list," 2 = "same list," 1 = "declined list," and 0 = "not renominated". Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

improved party list, same party list, declined party list, and not renominated. Results from the ordered logistic regressions are reported in Table 3.

Speechmaking is statistically significant at $p < 0.001$ in all four models, with its positive sign indicating that parliamentary speech is positively associated with improved

Table 4. Estimated changes in probability of renomination.

Baseline Pr. (renomination)	0.43	[0.40–0.47]
	Change in probability	95% Confidence intervals
Speech (log) (change from min. to max.)	0.53	[0.23 – 0.74]
PMBs (log) (change from min. to max.)	0.04	[–0.26 – 0.35]
Entropy (change from min. to max.)	0.33	[0.08 – 0.56]

Note: All variables are held at their mean values.

Table 5. Estimated changes in probability of promotion in party list.

Baseline Pr. (promotion)	0.11	[0.09 – 0.13]
	Change in probability	95% Confidence intervals
Speech (log) (change from min. to max.)	0.36	[0.18 – 0.57]
PMBs (log) (change from min. to max.)	–0.005	[–0.13 – 0.14]
Entropy (change from min. to max.)	0.15	[0.05 – 0.27]

Note: All variables are held at their mean values. Results based on additional simulation scenarios are reported in supplementary files. Holding electoral safety at its minimum and maximum value in two different scenarios, we examined the conditional effect of speechmaking on promotion and renomination. In line with H1B, our results show that electorally unsafe MPs did indeed benefit more from parliamentary activism than their safe counterparts.

career prospects. The interaction between speech and electoral safety is not statistically significant, a finding that is in line with our previous results. On the other hand, the interaction between PMBs and electoral safety indicates that the effect of PMBs on career prospects becomes negative for electorally safe MPs. In other words, MPs with safer seats who sought increasing policy influence through PMBs were either not rewarded or punished by the party leadership. Overall, results reported in Table 3 support our previous findings reported in Table 2: increasing number of parliamentary speeches and higher issue concentration help MPs obtain better career outcomes, whereas PMBs have no impact on career prospects of an average MP. It is clear that already prominent MPs are penalized for introducing or cosponsoring PMBs, a finding that is robust to different model specifications.⁷

Interpreting coefficients from nonlinear models is not straightforward (Long and Freese, 2006). For this reason, we simulate the substantive impact using *Clarify* and present the simulated probabilities in Tables 4 and 5 based on models 1 and 5, respectively (Tomz et al., 2003). Holding all variables at their mean values, increasing speech and

issue concentration probability from their minimum to maximum values increases the renomination probability by 0.53 and 0.33, respectively. The same change in speech and issue concentration increases the probability of promotion in party list by 0.36 and 0.15, respectively. In line with our main results, change in PMBs has no statistically significant effect on the probability of renomination and promotion in party list.

Our results are insensitive to the use of alternative dependent variables. Following André et al. (2015), we estimate OLS regressions to predict the decimal logarithm of the candidate's list position at election $t+1$, where we use the same set of performance and control variables utilized in the previous sections. Unlike previous models presented in Tables 2 and 3, these models utilize a much smaller sample ($N = 437$), excluding those who were not renominated (i.e. those without party ranks) in the following election. Our results (see Table 1A in Online Appendix) indicate that MPs who make more speeches during the legislative term they served ranked in higher ranks (smaller numbers) and it is statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.001$ levels in our models. Although PMBs has a negative impact on candidate's career prospects, the interaction between PMBs and electoral safety indicates that electorally safer MPs are more likely to be demoted down the list when they introduce or cosponsor PMBs. The R^2 obtained from these models shows that we can explain more than half of the variation in our dependent variable.

Discussion and conclusions

A growing body of research examines the link between candidate nomination procedures and parliamentary behavior in democratic polities. The main determinant of reelection has been assumed to be party loyalty in centralized systems and personalized activities that help MPs develop personal vote-earning attributes in decentralized systems. Candidate nomination in highly centralized systems, in particular, has received scant academic attention, further contributing to the reluctance in unpacking the dynamics of nomination decisions made behind closed doors.

Parliamentary performance is one's most visible asset; representatives are equipped with a variety of tools they can utilize to signal interest in party, policy, or constituency matters (Louwerse and Otjes, 2016). The extent to which MPs rely on their parliamentary activities for their nomination and promotion prospects, however, has been significantly undertheorized, as it is often assumed that personalized parliamentary activities have limited electoral payoffs in party-centered systems. We depart from this assumption and ask how parties would make nomination and promotion decisions in a world where there is no serious concern about MPs' loyalty to the party leadership. Drawing together the insights produced by the literatures on candidate nomination and parliamentary behavior, the

present study fills this gap by examining the effect of parliamentary speeches, PMBs, and issue concentration on parliamentarians' career paths in parliament.

While not definitive, our results are highly suggestive of the determinants of renomination and party-list decisions made by the party leadership in party-centered systems. The results show that while speechmaking consistently helps MPs get reelected and promoted in party list, introducing and cosponsoring PMBs harm the career prospects of already prominent MPs. Overall, the analyses lend strong support to our hypothesis that parliamentary performance is closely related to MPs' career prospects. We further suggest that these findings are hardly unique to the case of Turkey and applicable to other political systems with highly centralized and exclusive nomination procedures.

Results presented in this study call for rethinking the determinants of nomination and promotion decisions in systems where MPs' career prospects are assumed to depend solely on their loyalty to the party leadership. While acknowledging the necessity of toeing the party line for reselection, we show that the party leadership also takes into account MPs' parliamentary performance while making renomination and promotion decisions. Future research should delve further into this relationship under different political conditions.

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Supplemental material

Supplementary material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. Turkey has 81 provinces, and the electoral districts are defined accordingly. Nevertheless, there are more than one electoral district in three biggest cities depending on their population size. Istanbul has three electoral districts, while Ankara and Izmir have two for each.
2. Our sample size drops to 1009 as we exclude MPs with no party list (i.e. independents) and those who did not make any speech from our analysis due to our inability to measure

electoral safety for independent MPs and entropy scores for nonspeakers in parliament.

3. The measure of diversity, entropy, can be shown as $H = (-1) \sum p(x_i) \ln(p(x_i))$. See Jones and Baumgartner (2005) and Jennings et al. (2011). Increasing number of scholars argue that the entropy index outperforms other diversity measures (Boydston et al., 2014).
4. For this variable, we follow Bäck et al.'s (2014) classification of hard issues. Results do not change when we use various alternative measures of "hard issues."
5. We thank the anonymous reviewer for this point. We utilize content analytic data on the total number of bills initiated by each party, selecting the most salient five issues in parties' legislative agenda. These issues are government operations, education, crime, finance, and health care for the governing party; government operations, education, crime, macroeconomy, and defense for CHP; and government operations, education, social welfare, crime, and defense for MHP. The data come from Bulut (2015) and cover the period of 2003–2013.
6. We rely on the codebook of the Comparative Agendas Project to assign a topic category for parliamentary speeches, which can be found at <http://www.comparativeagendas.net/pages/master-codebook>. The coders received intense training until the inter-coder reliability reached 90%.
7. We replicated our models using an alternative measure of electoral competition (the number of seats obtained by candidate's party divided by candidate's party rank); our results have not changed. We ran additional models where we replaced the opposition variable with individual party variables. Again, our results have remained the same. We present these results in the supplementary file.

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