Status Incongruity and Backlash Against Female Legislators: How Legislative Speechmaking Benefits Men, but Harms Women

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Abstract

The literature on nomination procedures and intra-party politics shows that engagement in personalized parliamentary activities helps legislators get re-elected and promoted in the party list. However, as a considerable body of scholarly work suggests, women in leadership positions who are perceived to disconfirm the well-known gender stereotypes by being “too assertive” and “agentic” in the workplace may suffer from what social psychologists call the ‘backlash effect’ (i.e., facing economic and social sanctions). Integrating insights from the literatures on perceptions of female leadership and intra-party politics, we reveal the differential effect of legislative speechmaking on the career prospects of male and female members of parliament (MPs). Specifically, utilizing an original dataset of over 35,000 parliamentary speeches and the biographies of 2,140 MPs who served in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey between 1995 and 2011, we show that the well-documented positive effect of engagement in parliamentary activities on career prospects holds for male MPs, but not for their female counterparts. In fact, we found that female MPs who were active on the legislative floor were significantly less likely to get renominated and promoted in the party rank. These results imply that the challenges facing women in leadership positions go beyond electoral competition.
Introduction

Research on gender stereotypes in the workplace has documented considerable evidence that men and women are held to different standards when competence and leadership are evaluated (Eagly and Carli 2007; Eagly and Karau 2002; Heilman 2001; Brescoll 2016). This is mainly because men and women are typically thought to have different defining characteristics (Bakan 1966; Diekman and Eagly 2000; Abele 2003); while men are likely to be characterized in agentic terms such as dominance, ambition, achievement-orientation and assertiveness, women are typically thought to have communal qualities such as collaboration, friendliness, and emotional sensitivity (Williams and Best 1990). Because agentic qualities are stereotypically regarded as a prerequisite for effective leadership (Schein 2001; Eagly and Karau 2002), these well-established gender stereotypes “promote negative expectations about a woman’s performance by creating a perceived ‘lack of fit’ between the attributes women are thought to possess and the attributes thought necessary for success in traditionally male positions” (Heilman 2012, 114).

Earlier work in political science research showed that women officeholders are less likely to be evaluated as effective and capable political leaders due in part to “family responsibilities” and “hyperemotionalism” (Mezey 1978, 496-498; also see Kirkpatrick 1974). Elite surveys with Hawaiian state and local officeholders, for instance, revealed that the great majority of female legislators complain about sexism and bias against them by male representatives (Mezey 1978, 498). However, although effective leadership is typically perceived to require qualities associated with masculinity and agency, women in leadership positions who disconfirm gender stereotypes by displaying such qualities are disliked and face economic and social penalties (Rudman 1998; Rudman and Glick 1999, 2001; Heilman and Okimoto, 2007; Rudman and
Phelan 2008; Phelan et al. 2008; Brescoll 2011, 2016). At this point, women face a genuine problem: “Those who act agentically are seen as competent but unlikable; those who act communally are viewed as likable but incompetent” (Amanatullah and Tinsley 2013: 110).

The argument that women face social and economic penalties for exhibiting power-seeking intentions in male sex-typed roles has never been tested in legislatures. Studies have documented evidence that women are significantly underrepresented in legislative institutions in both advanced and developing democracies (Caul 1999; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Ashe and Stewart 2012; Ashe 2017), that political parties are generally less likely to recruit women compared to men (Fox and Lawless 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2002), and that female candidates are less likely to respond positively to recruitment efforts because they believe the party leadership provides more strategic and financial support for their male counterparts (Butler and Preece 2016). Despite a wealth of research on gender stereotypes in politics, however, we have scant knowledge of whether the negative perceptions of female leadership continue to shape women’s career prospects even after they are elected to office.

This study serves as the first attempt to explore the effect of women’s power-seeking behavior on their career prospects in a legislative setting. We bring together two well-established arguments from distinct fields of study to argue that taking the legislative floor has a differential effect on the career prospects of male and female MPs: While speaking time during group interactions (i.e., volubility) in legislatures helps MPs further their career and reputation (Searing 1994; Baumann et al. 2017; Yildirim et al. 2017; Slapin and Proksch 2010; Fernandes et al. 2017), being too active on the floor may have an adverse effect on the career prospects of female MPs. This is because active participation during group interactions, as the literature on power and volubility shows, signals dominance, competitiveness and power-seeking intentions (Bass
1949; Bales et al. 1951; Burroughs and Jaffe 1969; Gustafson and Harrell 1970; Stein and Heller 1979; Mullen et al. 1989; Mast 2001, 2002), the qualities that have been shown to hurt the career prospects of women working in male-dominated environments (Rudman 1998; Rudman and Glick 1999, 2001; Heilman and Okimoto, 2007; Rudman and Phelan 2008; Phelan et al. 2008; Amanatullah and Tinsley 2013; Brescoll 2011, 2016). Utilizing original datasets of parliamentary activities and the biographies of as many as 2,140 MPs who served in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) between 1995-2011, we explore the effect of legislative speechmaking on the prospects of renomination and promotion among male and female representatives. Our results show that gender gap in the equality of opportunity in politics goes beyond electoral competition. In particular, we show that parliamentary speechmaking benefits men, whereas it decreases the likelihood of women getting renominated and promoted in the party rank. These results have important implications for the study of perceptions of female leadership in legislatures, and intra-party politics.

In what follows, we first review the literature on perceptions of women in leadership positions and legislative behavior in party-centered systems. We then introduce our original dataset and methods utilized in the empirical investigation. The subsequent sections provide our results based on a series of logistic and ordered logistic regressions, and additional results from a series of robustness checks.

**Parliamentary Activities, Party Nominations and Female Parliamentarians**

As Sartori (1976) famously argued, candidate nomination procedures are considered to be one of the most important functions of political parties. A large strand of research has shown that the
variation in nomination procedures can help explain a wide range of political and social phenomena such as accountability and representation in modern democracies (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Rahat 2007). This body of research has explored “who selects” with regard to exclusiveness or inclusiveness of the selectorate and internal party democracy (Hazan and Rahat 2006; Rahat 2007; Indriðason and Kristinsson 2015); “who gets selected” with regard to socioeconomic characteristics, political experience, incumbency and political motivation of the candidates (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Ballington 2004; Rallings et al. 2008) and “what affects” those processes, such as political regime, party system, size of party, regional differences and party ideology (Lundell 2004; Shomer 2014; Kernell 2015). Given the role that nomination procedures play in shaping representational outcomes (Hazan and Rahat 2006; Rahat 2007), the consequences of these institutionalized practices have received scant academic attention in systems with centralized nomination procedures (Yildirim et al. 2017).

A burgeoning area of research on the link between parliamentary activism and political careers posits that engagement in parliamentary activities increases MPs’ career prospects (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Searing 1994; Slapin and Proksch 2010; Hermansen and Lyder 2016; Louwerse and Otjes 2016; Baumann et al. 2017; Fernandes et al. 2017; Ciftci and Yildirim 2017; Borghetto and Lisi 2018; Papp and Russo 2018). Representatives engage in parliamentary activities for a number of reasons; namely, for influencing the legislative agenda (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Green-Pedersen 2010), signaling interest in particular issues (Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011, Vliegenthart et al. 2013), and for credit-claiming and position taking (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996, 821). More importantly, this is not unique to the systems that foster personal vote-earning attributes. Recent scholarship has shown that parliamentary speechmaking helps MPs further their political careers even in party-centered systems.
(Marangoni and Russo 2016; Yildirim et al. 2017; Borghetto and Lisi 2018), where personal vote-earning attributes are of limited importance for the career prospects of representatives (Carey and Shugart 1995). Although as of yet absent from the literature on legislative behavior, the effect of parliamentary activities on the career prospects of legislators may vary across demographic characteristics.

**Status Incongruity and Backlash Against Women in Politics**

Evidence from across the globe suggests that women in politics face important gender-specific challenges (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Ballington 2004; Iwanaga 2005; Schmidt 2009; Fox and Lawless 2010; Bhandare and Katarki 2014; Valdini 2012; Spary 2014; Bernauer et al. 2015, Kostadinova 2007). One line of research posits that the gender gap in political careers emerges well before elections take place, at the stage of recruitment (Fox and Lawless 2010; Lawless and Fox 2010; Crowder-Meyer 2013; Kanthak and Woon 2015; Preece et al. 2016; Butler and Preece 2016). Butler and Preece (2016, 848) demonstrate that although female candidates for political office “are equally likely to believe that party elites help recruits overall, they do not believe party elites will help most of the women they recruit to the same extent as they help identical men they recruit.” While a great deal of work has been done on electoral and pre-electoral challenges facing women in politics, however, we have scant knowledge of whether these challenges persist even after female candidates are elected to office, especially in party-centered systems where the career prospects of representatives are determined by a small group of elites.

As discussed in the previous section, one of the received wisdoms in the study of legislative politics is that engagement in parliamentary activities boosts the career prospects of representatives. Nevertheless, a distinct body of research in social psychology has documented
evidence that casts doubt on the utility of active participation in group discussions for female representatives working in male-dominated legislatures. Speaking time during group interactions has been shown to be closely linked to perceptions of dominance, power-seeking and achievement-orientation (Stein and Heller 1979; Mullen et al. 1989; Mast 2001), which are the qualities that benefit men more than women (Okimoto and Brescoll 2010).

A large literature in social psychology has shed light on gender stereotypes in the perceptions of female leadership (Eagly and Carli 2007; Eagly and Karau 2002; Heilman 2001; Brescoll 2016). According to Heilman (2001, 660), “the skills and attributes presumed to be required to handle male sex-typed roles effectively do not correspond to the attributes believed to characterize women as a group.” Reflecting this view, it has been widely accepted that women and men have distinct attributes that characterize their behavior in social, economic and political life (Bakan 1966; Abele 2003; Diekman and Eagly 2000). While men are typically perceived to be “agentic” (i.e., competent, ambitious, assertive, dominant, self-reliant), the defining characteristic of women is “communality” (kind, caring, considerate, warm, friendly, intuitive, self-effacing) (Heilman 2012, 115). These well-established stereotypes lead to inequities in the career prospects of men and women (Gaucher et al. 2011; Lynes and Heilman 2006), as they “become the lens through which information is filtered, including what behavior is attended to, how that behavior is interpreted, and whether it is remembered when critical decisions are made” (Lyness and Heilman 2006, 777). Following this line of logic, it has been further hypothesized that women and men are not held to same standards for recruitment and promotion in leadership positions (Lyness and Heilman 2006), as such positions are traditionally perceived to require masculine attributes (Heilman et al. 1989; Martell et al. 1998). For instance, Rosenwasser and Dean (1989) point out that national political offices are perceived to be more masculine than
feminine tasks, where masculine candidates are evaluated as being more competent. Therefore, for women, one way to minimize inequities in recruitment and promotion decisions is to engage in ‘agentic’ behaviors in order to signal that there is no ‘lack of fit’ (Heilman 2001).

However, research on social psychology shows that women seeking to obtain leadership positions face another challenge. In a seminal work, Rudman (1998) posits that behaving counterstereotypically results in social and economic penalties (i.e., ‘backlash’) for women in leadership positions. Empirical evidence supports this assertion. A growing body of research found strong support for the backlash theory and showed that women who disconfirm gender stereotypes are more likely to receive negative reactions (Rudman and Phelan 2008). Specifically, scholars show that engagement in ‘agentic’ behaviors decreases women’s likeability ratings and harms their career prospects (Rudman 1998; Rudman and Glick 1999, 2001). In contrast, men benefit from engagement in assertive and agentic behaviors (Rudman et al. 2012; Eagly et al. 1992, 1995).

Subsequently, women in executive positions face an important dilemma, one in which they have no choice but to signal the qualities that are associated with the perceptions of strong leadership in order to disconfirm the well-established gender stereotypes, which in turn decreases their likeability and results in social and economic penalties (Amanatullah and Tinsley 2013).

Integrating insights from the literatures on perceptions toward female leadership and intra-party politics, we make the first attempt to explore the negative consequences of behaving counterstereotypically for women in a parliamentary setting. We expect to find that taking the legislative floor has a differential effect on the career prospects of men and women in the parliament. To recap, previous scholarship showed that engagement in parliamentary activities helps MPs get re-nominated and promoted in the party list (Hermansen and Lyder 2016; Yildirim et al. 2017; Papp and Russo 2018; Borghetto and Lisi 2018) and allow them to signal interest in
issues that matter most for the public, media and party leadership (Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011, Vliegenthart et al. 2013). Engagement in parliamentary activities may be of crucial importance especially for women in parliament, as women competing with men in male sex-typed jobs often need to display masculine qualities (Ayata and Tutuncu 2008; Amanatullah and Tinsley 2013). As many of the female interviewees in Blair and Stanley (1991, 497) stated, it is crucial for female representatives to “command respect, speak forcefully, show assurance, be tenacious, be aggressive, be assertive… be tough and mean, establish the reputation of power, have a strong will, know who you are and never be wishy-washy.” However, engagement in such personalized activities may be perceived as “too assertive” and harm female MPs’ career prospects “because of inconsistency between the predominantly communal qualities that perceivers associate with women and the predominantly agentic qualities they believe are required to succeed as a leader” (Eagly and Karau 2002, 575; see also Amanatullah and Tinsley 2013). Based on this line of reasoning, we propose the following hypotheses:

**H1.** MPs who make more speeches in the parliament are more likely to be re-nominated and promoted in the party list in the following elections.

**H2.** Female MPs who make more speeches are less likely to be re-nominated and promoted in the party list in the following elections.

**Women and Politics in Turkey**

It is worth pausing at this point to provide some background information about women and politics in Turkey. According to the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005-2009), more than half of the respondents in Turkey agreed with the statement that “men make better political
leaders”. To put it in perspective, at least 40 percent or more of the Chinese, Hungarian, South Korean, Indonesian, Romanian, South African, Polish, Chilean and Serbian respondents agreed with the same statement. This ratio ranges between 20 percent and 25 percent in the US, Australia and France, among other industrialized countries. These numbers imply that the perceptions of female leadership and gender stereotypes are not unique to Turkey, though there is considerable variation across countries.

Turkey introduced full political rights for women, including the right to elect and be elected nationwide, in the early 1930s, well before several industrialized nations including France, Italy, Belgium, and Japan. The rise of the women’s movement in Turkey was short-lived, however, as expanding political rights have failed to pave the way for increasing women’s presence in politics. According to the dataset compiled by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Turkey lags behind the majority of industrialized countries except South Korea and Japan in the percentage of women in legislatures. Nonetheless, as of 2018, women’s presence in the parliament in Turkey (17.4 percent) is similar to that in many countries such as the US (23.5 percent), Greece (18.7 percent), Croatia (18.5 percent), Luxembourg (20 percent), Brazil (15 percent), and Russia (15.8 percent).

Although Turkey is a relatively low performer in electing women, there have been a large number of occasions where female legislators managed to climb the ladder of elective office from representative to minister of state, party leader and prime minister. In fact, Tansu Ciller, the first female prime minister to be elected in Turkey, is among the prominent political figures who have had considerable impact on Turkish politics in the last few decades. Currently, two opposition parties in the parliament, Iyi Party and the pro-Kurdish HDP, are led by women. Moreover, empirical evidence from recent studies showed that women in the Turkish parliament
do not simply attend the legislative proceedings; they sponsor bills and make speeches about a wide range of issues (Bektas and Issever-Ekinci 2018; Yildirim 2018). In short, while women representation in parliament is fairly limited the doors of key positions are not closed on female legislators.

The Turkish case provides two unique opportunities to test the backlash effect in legislatures. First, Turkey employs a closed-list proportional representation electoral system, where candidate nominations are determined exclusively by the party leadership (Yildirim et al. 2017; Ciftci and Yildirim 2018; Ecevit and Kocapinar 2018). Secondly, women have been historically underrepresented in the parliament and in the party leadership (Arat 1989), which in turn created an environment dominated by male MPs. Since representatives are reelection seekers (Strøm 1997) and engagement in parliamentary activities help MPs further their careers (Yildirim et al. 2017; Papp and Russo 2018; Borghetto and Lisi 2018), there is a great incentive for female MPs to resemble their male counterparts in parliamentary behavior (Ayata and Tutuncu 2008; Schwindt-Bayer 2011). ¹ Indeed, based on a series of interviews conducted with female parliamentarians in Turkey, Ayata and Tutuncu (2008) found that women are reluctant to differentiate themselves from their male counterparts. As one of their interviewees stated, “in order for women MPs to be successful in Turkish parliamentary culture, they have to be quarrelsome like men MPs” (2008, 465). For these reasons, the Turkish case provides a unique opportunity to explore the extent to which engagement in parliamentary activities further the career prospects of men and women. More specifically, it allows us to examine whether power-seeking female MPs are penalized by the party leadership.

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¹ We assume that a parliamentary seat is the highest office one can seek in the Turkish political arena as Turkey is a unitary state and a unicameral system with strong party governments.
Data and Methods

We make use of two original datasets that include over 35,000 parliamentary speeches and the demographic and political characteristics of representatives who served in the GNAT between 1995 and 2011. The parliamentary questions were first content-coded based on the coding scheme of the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) and then collapsed by individual MPs to merge with representative characteristics (see Bulut and Yildirim 2018). As the second step, we have compiled data about MPs’ renomination and changes in the party rank over four election cycles, which left us with 2,140 MPs who served in the parliament during the period under investigation.

Our dependent variable, renomination measures whether the MP was renominated in the following election. The renomination rate for the 20th (1995-1999), 21st (1999-2002), 22nd (2002-2007) and 23rd (2007-2011) terms were 54 per cent, 26 per cent, 44 per cent, and 40 per cent, respectively. Interestingly, women’s renomination rates were higher than those of their male counterparts in the 20th (59 per cent vs. 54 per cent) and 23rd terms (48 per cent vs. 39 per cent), whereas men outperformed women in the 21st (28 per cent vs. 3 per cent) and 22nd terms (44 per cent vs. 38 per cent).

We utilize two sets of independent variables. Political variables include party affiliations, MP seniority (total terms served in parliament), age, and the district magnitude. The second set of variables includes performance variables such as parliamentary speeches, ‘hard issues’ and the interaction between gender and parliamentary speeches. Following Bäck et al. (2014), we coded the speeches relating to macroeconomics, energy, transportation, banking, finance, and domestic
commerce, space, science, technology and communications as ‘hard issues’, which account for 63 per cent of the speeches. The mean of parliamentary speeches for male and female MPs is 16.6 and 12.5, respectively. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1, Table 1Sa (male-only sample), and Table 1Sb (female-only sample).

Table 1 Here

Results

We start our analysis by estimating a series of logistic regression models that predict candidate re-nomination in four election cycles between 1995 and 2011. Results are reported in Table 2. Building on previous scholarship on gender stereotypes and the status incongruity hypothesis, we argued that parliamentary speechmaking should have differential impact on the career prospects of male and female MPs. Initial findings lend strong support to this hypothesis. As shown in models 1 through 4, while female MPs, on average, are more likely to get re-nominated in the consequent electoral cycle, parliamentary speechmaking appears to harm the female MPs’ career prospects. The interaction term carries a negative sign and statistically significant in all four models, indicating that speechmaking has differential effects on the re-nomination prospects of men and women. It is clear from the table that although speechmaking, on average, increases the probability of getting re-nominated in the following election, female MPs who took the legislative floor more frequently were less likely to get re-nominated. Finally, it is important to note that re-nomination patterns vary significantly by political parties and legislative terms.

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2 Turkish politics in the late 1990s witnessed turbulent times, a period best known for party closures, economic crises and unstable coalition governments. These irregularities may help explain why the renomination rate was so low in the 21st term.
Table 2 Here

Figure 1 provides a more nuanced picture of the differential effect of speechmaking in the parliament. The figure clearly shows that parliamentary speechmaking has exactly the opposite impact on the prospects of re-nomination of male and female MPs. More specifically, it shows that the likelihood of female MPs getting re-nominated decreases as the number of speeches increases. For male MPs, speechmaking is positively associated with the likelihood of renomination. The effect of speechmaking on the renomination of male and female MPs becomes statistically different after about the mean number of speeches, indicating that the career prospects of men and women who remain relatively inactive in the proceedings are not affected differentially by speechmaking. To put it differently, the clear pattern shown in the figure illustrates that male MPs fail to outperform their female counterparts in renomination so long as women are not ‘too active’ on the floor.

We utilize an alternative dependent variable and delve further into the effect of parliamentary speechmaking on career outcomes by estimating a series of ordered logistic regressions, where our new dependent variable measures whether an MP is re-nominated with a higher rank in party list (4), re-nominated with the same rank (3), re-nominated with a lower rank (2), and not re-nominated (1). Results are presented in Table 2S (in the supplementary file). The interaction term carries a negative sign in all four models and reaches statistical significance at p<0.05 and p<0.1. That is, while female MPs are more likely to get re-nominated and promoted in the party list their career prospects are negatively associated with speechmaking in the parliament (p<0.10 and p<0.05).
Additionally, based on the female-only and male-only samples, we also estimate two baseline models that consist of speech and election cycle variables and simulate the substantive impact while holding other variables constant at their means or modes. Results show that the probability of getting renominated increases by 25 per cent (from 0.33 to 0.41) for male MPs when increasing the speech variable from its minimum to the mean value. In contrast, the same procedure decreases the probability of female MPs getting renominated by 43 per cent (from 0.49 to 0.28).

Finally, these results are insensitive to the use of alternative measure of ‘agentic’ behavior. Following the literature on power and volubility in organizations, we used total amount of speeches as a measure of ‘agency’, but one could also employ alternative measures. For instance, women who take up “hard issues” that are traditionally in the men’s domain may be punished for doing so.3 Replacing the total amount of speeches with hard speeches in Table 2, we replicate our main models and report the results in Table 3S in the Supplementary File. Results are greatly in line with our original findings, though the explanatory power of these models are slightly weaker. All in all, these results lend strong support to the hypothesis that women in leadership positions face backlash for engagement in agentic behaviors.

Discussion
The link between engagement in parliamentary activities and MPs’ career prospects has been well documented by previous scholarship. Empirical research suggests that MPs benefit from the tools that are at their disposal in the parliament such as parliamentary speeches and questions in order to signal interest in constituency problems or to promote party issues (Slapin and Proksch
However, no attempt has been made to explore whether the effect of legislative activities on legislators’ career outcomes varies by gender. This comes as sizable surprise, as research in social psychology has convincingly showed that women in leadership positions suffer from what psychologists call the ‘backlash effect’ (Rudman and Phelan 2008; Brescoll 2016). According to this argument, women in leadership positions risk negative reactions for engaging in self-promoting, assertive and dominant behaviors (i.e., ‘agentic’ behavior). Thus, although engagement in personalized activities in the parliament has been hypothesized to increase legislators’ career prospects in general, female MPs may not benefit equally from taking the parliamentary floor, as doing so may be perceived to be ‘disconfirming gender stereotypes’ (Rudman and Phelan 2008).

We make the first attempt to explore whether male and female MPs benefit equally from taking the floor in a political environment where women representation in the legislature is extremely limited and career outcomes are determined exclusively by the party leadership. We examined the renomination and promotion decisions in Turkey over four election cycles between 1995 and 2011. Our results show that parliamentary speechmaking does indeed influence the career prospects of legislators, yet this effect varies significantly by gender. In particular, we found that while engagement in parliamentary speechmaking helps male MPs it harms the career prospects of their female counterparts. This result ties in nicely with the empirical findings documented by previous scholarship in regard to the backlash effect.

These findings have important implications for the study of intra-party politics, gender politics and legislative behavior. Previous scholarship has shown that women are less likely to respond positively to recruitment efforts and are ‘election averse’, as they believe that the political environment is male-dominated and it discourages women to participate in the political

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3 We thank anonymous reviewers for raising this point.
life (see Butler and Preece 2016). Our results suggest that challenges facing women in politics go beyond electoral competition and recruitment efforts. Furthermore, our findings help explain why women are reluctant to speak about ‘hard’ issues that are traditionally perceived to be in men’s domain and why women are less active on the parliamentary floor (Jones 1997; Bäck et al. 2014; Schwindt-Bayer 2006).

The empirical findings reported in the present study are provocative but clearly not definitive. First of all, more work surely needs to be done in identifying whether our findings hold in other contexts such as in countries with higher women representation in legislatures. Although the empirical applications of the backlash theory have focused exclusively on advanced democracies and have implicitly assumed that the social and economic penalties facing women in leadership positions are similar across countries, the extent to which female legislators risk the backlash effect for engaging ‘agentic behavior’ may still vary greatly by the context. We also know little about whether female candidates who look ‘too ambitious’ are disliked by the public. For instance, numerous journalistic accounts during the 2016 presidential campaign in the US have gone so far as to suggest that Hillary Clinton was disliked because she was ‘too ambitious’ and ‘too power-hungry’, though no scholarly attention has been devoted to exploring this possibility. Future research examining the link between candidates’ power-seeking behavior and their likeability in various contexts would prove useful in identifying the challenges facing women in leadership positions.
Tables and Figures

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renomination</td>
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<td>0.413</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Age</td>
<td>2,137</td>
<td>48.93</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Terms Served in Parliament</td>
<td>2,135</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Magnitude</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>7.274</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>2,140</td>
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<td>DYP</td>
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<td>0.304</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>0.0589</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speech (log)</td>
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<td>2.255</td>
<td>1.088</td>
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<td>Female x Speech (log)</td>
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<td>RP/FP</td>
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<td>Hard Issues (%)</td>
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<td>0.244</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>20th Term</td>
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<td>21st Term</td>
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<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.437</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>22nd Term</td>
<td>2,140</td>
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<td>0.430</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Logistic Regression on the Determinants of Candidate Re-nomination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>(0.608)</td>
<td>(0.601)</td>
<td>(0.555)</td>
<td>(0.494)</td>
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<td>Female x Speech (log)</td>
<td>-0.660**</td>
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<td>-0.552**</td>
<td>-0.407**</td>
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<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.256***</td>
<td>0.215***</td>
<td>0.155***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0559)</td>
<td>(0.0546)</td>
<td>(0.0489)</td>
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<td>Hard Issues (%)</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.118</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.0397***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00675)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Terms Served</td>
<td>0.00642</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0611)</td>
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<tr>
<td>District Magnitude</td>
<td>0.0198***</td>
<td>0.0116*</td>
<td>0.0113*</td>
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<td>(0.00660)</td>
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<td>AKP</td>
<td>0.381**</td>
<td>0.544***</td>
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<td>(0.145)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>2.676***</td>
<td>2.736***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.309)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.084</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.127)</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 1: The Differential Effect of Legislative Speechmaking on the Career Prospects of Men and Women
References


Bhandare, N. and Katarki, S. 2014. ‘Women Get a Raw Deal from Parties in Ticket Distribution’, Live Mint, 30 April,


Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2009. “‘Women in National Parliaments.’” http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm


